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Why Aren't You Working?: Medlin with Proof
of Disability Under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act
MICHAEL F. ROESSLER*

ABSTRACT
Individuals hurt on the job face potential uncertainty about their eligibility
for benefits under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.
Whereas the state's courts historically interpretedthe law as allowing an
injured worker to prove loss of wage-earning capacity following a work
injury without any regard to overall economic conditions, the North
CarolinaSupreme Court recently announced the demise of this absolutist

rule in Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Construction, LLC and articulateda new
rule allowing overall economic conditions to affect an injured worker's
claim of disability, at least in some circumstances.
The supreme court was wrong to adopt this change, as this Article
explains. That said, the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North
Carolina Industrial Commission, the administrative agency charged with
administeringthe workers' compensation laws, are bound by the supreme
court's decision. The second purpose of this Article, therefore, is to fill a
significant gap left by the supreme court's recent decision by addressing
when and how injured workers must concern themselves with the possible
effects of overall economic conditions on their post-injury ability to earn
wages. These issues went unaddressed by the supreme court in Medlin,

and this Article attempts to fill in these details by suggesting a
burden-shiftingframework to govern adjudication of disputes over whether
economic conditions-and not a work injury-are the cause of an
individual's loss of wage-earning capacity. This framework is consistent
with the supreme court's decision in Medlin, but also prevents the workers'
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compensation system from becoming unduly hostile to people hurt on the
job and in need of help.
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INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty looms for injured workers in North Carolina. A recent
state supreme court decision upended well-established standards governing
a key component of workers' compensation law,' and the tens of thousands
of people hurt on the job every year 2 face new questions about their
eligibility for wage-replacement benefits. 3 Specifically, proving disability
after a workplace injury threatens to become more difficult, at least in some
circumstances, after the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Construction, LLC.4
In Medlin, the court abandoned decades of policy and sound precedent
when it concluded that broad economic and market conditions were
"undoubtedly relevant"' to an injured worker's claim to wage-replacement
benefits after he is hurt on the job.6 The court explained:

1. The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act is codified as Article 1 of Chapter
97 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
2. See N.C. INDUS.

COMM'N., ANNUAL

REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014

1

(2014),

http://www.ncleg.net/documentsites/committees/govops/Full%20Commission/201/4%20Me
etings/08_October/o202014/Mandated%2OReports/Natural%20&%2OEconomic%20Resour
ces/Industrial%20Commission Annual Report%202014.2014.10.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
63Y3-J245] (noting that approximately 72,000 workers' compensation claims were filed in
the 2013-14 fiscal year).
3. In lieu of the sometimes-used phrase "indemnity benefits," this Article uses the
phrase "wage-replacement benefits" to describe those cash payments received by injured
workers who prove their eligibility for such payments under the Workers' Compensation
Act.
4. Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 2014).
5. Id. at 738.
6. Id.
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Whether in a boom or bust economy, a claimant's inability to find equally
lucrative work [after a workplace injury] is a function of both economic
conditions and his specific limitations. Both factors necessarily determine
whether a specific claimant is able to obtain employment that pays as well
as his previous position. 7
Whereas the state's courts previously held that overall economic
circumstances were never relevant to a claim for wage-replacement
benefits, the Medlin court concluded that, at least in some circumstances,
an injured worker must be prepared to address the effect of overall
economic conditions on his post-injury loss of wage-earning capacity. In
other words, an individual claiming wage-replacement benefits under the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act must now be prepared in some
circumstances to persuade the North Carolina Industrial Commission 9 not
only that his workplace injury has depressed his ability to earn
wages-referred
to in the workers'
compensation
system as
"disability"-but that the overall health of the economy is not the reason he
is earning less than he did before he was hurt.' 0
The court got this wrong. That said, this Article, while explaining
why the court was incorrect as a matter of policy and precedent, recognizes
that the decision is binding on all state lower courts and administrative
7.
8.
9.
claims

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 737-38.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission is charged with the duty of adjudicating
that arise under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-77 (2015) (creating the Commission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (2015)
(assigning to the Commission the duty to decide disputes between workers and employers
that arise under the Act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-91 (2015) (stating that all questions arising
under the Act "shall be determined by the Commission"). The Commission may appoint
deputy commissioners to act as trial judges, with appeals of right to the Full Commission.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (stating that "[tihe parties may be heard by a deputy"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-85(a) (2015) (stating that the Full Commission "shall review" an award
from a deputy commissioner if the award is appealed). Following a decision by the Full
Commission, an appeal of right lies to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which hears
cases in three-judge panels. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (2015) (stating that decisions of
the Full Commission may be appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-29(a) (2015) (creating an appeal of right from the North Carolina Industrial
Commission to the North Carolina Court of Appeals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (2015)
(stating that the court of appeals shall hear cases in three-judge panels). Appeals of right
from the North Carolina Court of Appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court arise only
in limited circumstances, including when the court of appeals issues a split decision, as
occurred in Medlin. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2015) (stating an appeal of right to
the supreme court arises when there is a dissent in a case decided by the court of appeals);
see Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 748 S.E.2d 343, 347-52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013)
(Geer, J., dissenting), aff'd, 760 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 2014).
10. Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 737-38.
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agencies," which are now charged with the duty of applying the rule
announced in Medlin to the tens of thousands of claims for workers'
compensation benefits brought annually in North Carolina. So while the
first aim of this Article is to critique the decision in Medlin, a second, more
important purpose is to suggest a reasonable, practical evidentiary
framework within which the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the
North Carolina Industrial Commission can abide by Medlin-a framework
not provided by the supreme court in its decision. While the court in
Medlin explained a claimant may be required in some cases to address the
role of overall economic conditions on his loss of wage-earning capacity,
the court said nothing about when or how a claimant would be required to
do so.1 2 The court's failure to provide a way of applying Medlin to future
claims threatens needless, significant disruption under the state's workers'
compensation law, and this Article seeks to understand Medlin in a way
that avoids such disruption.
Prior to Medlin, it was well-established that when a worker was hurt
on the job and suffered limitations or restrictions' 3 as a result of that
workplace injury, any diminishment in his ability to earn wages was
attributable to the injury, entitling him to wage-replacement benefits.' 4 In
short, a claimant who proved he was hurt on the job, suffered work
limitations as a result of the injury, and earned less following the injury met
his burden of proving he was disabled. That is not always or necessarily
the case after Medlin. Now, that same worker, at least in some cases, also
may have to address whether any diminishment in his wage-earning
capacity is the result of broader market conditions, not his workplace
injury.' 5 Whereas broader market conditions were always irrelevant before
Medlin, they are now sometimes relevant to an injured worker's burden of
proof before he is entitled to compensation for his lost wage-earning
capacity. What the Medlin court did not explain, though, is when or how
overall economic conditions are to be considered.
11. See Cannon v. Miller, 327 S.E.2d 888, 888 (N.C. 1985) (noting that the courts are
obligated to observe supreme court precedent "until otherwise ordered by the Supreme
Court").
12. See Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 737-38.
13. This Article uses "limitations" and "restrictions" interchangeably to refer to any
limitations a worker faces in his abilities as a result of an on-the-job injury. Such
restrictions can include, for example, limitations on the amount of weight a worker can lift,
push, or pull, the amount of time a worker can stand or sit, or prohibitions on certain
activities, such as climbing, kneeling, or crawling.
14. See infra Part I-A.
15. See Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 738 (concluding that "a claimant's inability to find
equally lucrative work [after an on-the-job injury] is a function of both economic conditions
and his specific limitations").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss2/3
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The new rule announced in Medlin, if not properly understood,
threatens to be a pitfall for injured workers, one that could be interpreted as
requiring individuals to always prove a negative regarding something over
which they have no control: that the strength or weakness of the economy
is not the reason they no longer earn as they did before they got hurt.
Properly interpreted, though, the rule announced in Medlin poses no such
threat, at least not in the vast majority of cases.
Reasonable rules
governing the evidentiary burden of production in workers' compensation
cases-rules familiar to the law generally1 6 and the North Carolina
workers' compensation system specifically 7 -can be crafted in a way that
abide by Medlin while still honoring the overall purpose of the workers'
compensation laws and preventing the workers' compensation system from
becoming intolerably inhospitable to those who are hurt on the job and to
whom the system's benefits are supposed to liberally flow. 18
Part I of this Article reviews the relevant principles and rules
governing North Carolina's workers' compensation system, recounts the
facts of Medlin, and explains the holding in Medlin, all in the service of
critiquing the case as incorrectly decided. Part II suggests how the North
Carolina Industrial Commission and the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
both of which are obligated to honor Medlin,1 9 can properly implement
Medlin in a manner consistent with the purpose and spirit of the state's
workers' compensation laws, thereby minimizing the needless disruption
Medlin causes.
At a time when benefits for those hurt on the job face reduction by
legislation,2 0 it is especially inappropriate for the judiciary to threaten a
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Blythe Dev. Co., 665 S.E.2d 154, 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(stating that in the context of a motion for summary judgment, "[o]nce the party seeking
summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations,
showing that he can at least establish a primafacie case at trial"); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) ("The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the
initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination... . The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.").
17. See infra Part II.
18. See, e.g., Hollman v. City of Raleigh, Pub. Utils. Dep't, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (N.C.
1968) ("We have held in decision after decision that our Workmen's Compensation Act
should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured
employees or their dependents, and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow,
and strict construction.").
19. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Michael Grabell and Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers' Comp,
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workerscompensation [https://perma.cc/7F3B-DDDJ] (reporting that "state after state [over the last
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similar reduction by way of interpretation. At first glance, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Medlin threatens to do just that.
Properly understood, though, the decision in Medlin need not have this
effect. It is to an explanation of this proper understanding of Medlin that
this Article is dedicated.
I.

THE LAW OF DISABILITY BEFORE AND AFTER MEDLIN

Most of the basic principles of workers' compensation law in North
Carolina are unaffected by Medlin, but the single change Medlin threatens
to introduce, if the case is not properly understood, is potentially dramatic.
To appreciate the proper scope of the change adopted by Medlin, a brief
review of the relevant provisions of the state's workers' compensation law
is required.
A.

Workers' CompensationLaw Before Medlin

North Carolina established its workers' compensation system in the
early twentieth century "to compel industry to take care of its own
wreckage" 2 1 by requiring "that the wear and tear of human beings in
modem industry should be charged to the industry just as the wear and tear
of machinery has always been charged." 22 At their core, workers'
compensation laws are a compromise between workers and employers: 23
injured workers forego common law remedies for injuries suffered on the
decade] has been dismantling America's workers' comp system with disastrous
consequences for many of the hundreds of thousands of people who suffer serious injuries at
work each year"). While North Carolina's workers' compensation system has so far
avoided dismantling, the state legislature recently adopted several provisions unfriendly to
injured workers. See, e.g., Protecting and Putting North Carolina Back to Work Act, ch.
287, sec. 2, § 97-2, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1087 (adding the definition of "suitable
employment" and defining it to exclude whether a post-injury job pays an injured worker at
a rate comparable to his pre-injury job, thereby potentially requiring an injured worker to
take a post-injury job making substantially less than he made when injured); id. sec. 10,
§ 97-29(b), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1094 (imposing a 500 week cap on wage-replacement
benefits for most injured workers). Not all recent legislative changes were hostile to injured
workers. See, e.g., id. sec. 14, § 97-38(3), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1098 (increasing the
amount of death benefits due to a worker's dependents from 400 to 500 weeks of the
worker's wage-replacement benefits).
21. Barber v. Minges, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (N.C. 1943).
22. Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (N.C. 1951) (quoting Cox v.
Kan. City Ref. Co., 195 P. 863, 865 (Kan. 1921)); see also Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d
582, 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) ("Worker compensation laws were enacted to treat the cost
of industrial accidents as a cost of production.").
23. See, e.g., Kellams v. Carolina Metal Prod., Inc., 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (N.C. 1958)
(stating that "[tihe fixing of maximum and minimum awards in industry is a compromise").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss2/3
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job in exchange for the "swift and certain remedy" 24 of medical care and
compensation for lost earning capacity, 25 and employers agree to pay those
limited benefits in exchange for being absolved of liability for any damages
beyond those provided by the workers' compensation system. 2 6
The concept of disability lies at the heart of the workers'
compensation system. The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act
defines disability as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which
the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other
employment." 27
Thus, in the world of workers' compensation, the
definition of disability "specifically relates to the incapacity to earn wages,
rather than only to physical infirmity." 28 North Carolina has employed this
standard since the advent of the state's workers' compensation system.29
When a worker is disabled, the law provides cash payments to make up for
lost earnings, with the amount of those payments determined by his
pre-injury wages and the degree of disability following injury.30

24. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (N.C. 1966).
25. See, e.g., Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 25 S.E.2d 865, 868 (N.C. 1943) ("In
short, under our Act wages earned, or the capacity to earn wages, is the test of earning
capacity, or, to state it differently, the diminution of the power or capacity to earn is the
measure of compensability."). Medical care and payment of wage-replacement benefits still
constitute the core of North Carolina's workers' compensation system. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25(a) (2015) ("Medical compensation shall be provided by the employer."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-29(a) (2015) ("When an employee qualifies for total disability, the employer
shall pay or cause to be paid . .. to the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to
sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly wages."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-30 (2015) ("[W]here the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the
employer shall pay, or cause to be paid . . . to the injured employee during such disability, a
weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the difference
between his average weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages which
he is able to earn thereafter.").
26. See, e.g., Barnhardt, 146 S.E.2d at 484 (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 345
S.E.2d 374, 378-79 (N.C. 1986) and Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 324 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C.
1985))
(noting that employers benefit from the compromise because workers'
compensation laws set "a limited and determinate liability"); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-10.1 (2015) (stating that the Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for
injured workers who seek recovery for their injuries).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (2015).
28. Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732, 736 (N.C. 2014).
29. Id. (citing the definition of "disability" used since the adoption of North Carolina's
first workers' compensation law in 1929).
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29(a) ("When an employee qualifies for total disability,
the employer shall pay or cause to be paid ... to the injured employee a weekly
compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly
wages."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 ("[W]here the incapacity for work resulting from the
injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid . .. to the injured employee
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The North Carolina Supreme Court articulated a three-part test an
injured worker must meet to prove disability in Hilliardv. Apex Cabinet
Co.,31 a test reaffirmed in Medlin.32 To show disability, an injured worker
must prove:
(1) that [he] was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he
had earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that [he] was
incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before
his injury in any other em loyment, and (3) that [his] incapacity to earn
was caused by [his] injury.
This final element-that the injured workers' injury was the cause of his
diminished earning capacity-was long ago recognized as "the very sheet
anchor of the Workmen's Compensation Act." 34 The burden of proving all
three prongs of disability generally lies with the injured worker.3 s
Prior to Medlin, overall economic conditions were never relevant to a
worker's claim that his injury caused disability. 36 Rather, North Carolina's
courts assessed disability by asking whether the injured worker could earn
his pre-injury wages "under normally prevailing market conditions" 3 7 or
"in the open market under normal employment, conditions." 38 In other
words, before Medlin, an injured worker and his employer were always
required to take the labor market as they found it, and the injured worker's
ability to compete within that labor market was assessed against
non-injured workers in the same labor market, no matter the strength or
weakness of the market. In the context of such a market, the courts would

during such disability, a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent
(66 2/3%) of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and the
average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter.").
31. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (N.C. 1982).
32. See Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 737 ("We reaffirm that a claimant seeking to establish
that he is legally disabled must prove all three statutory elements as explained in
[Hilliard].").
33. Hilliard, 290 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Watkins v. Motor Lines, 181 S.E.2d 588 (N.C.
1971)).
34. Perry v. Am. Bakeries Co., 136 S.E.2d 643, 647 (N.C. 1964) (quoting Duncan v.
Charlotte, 66 S.E.2d 22, 25 (N.C. 1951))).
35. See Hilliard, 290 S.E.2d at 683 ("In workers' compensation cases, a claimant
ordinarily has the burden of proving both the existence of his disability and its degree."
(citing Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (N.C. 1965)). The Medlin court
reaffirmed this aspect of Hilliard, too. See Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 736 ("The burden of
proving the existence and extent of a disability is generally carried by the claimant." (citing
Clark v. Wal-Mart, 619 S.E.2d 491, 493 (N.C. 2005))).
36. See, e.g., Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 342 S.E.2d 798, 806 (N.C. 1986).
37. Id
38. Id
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8

Roessler: Why Aren't You Working? Medlin with Proof of Disability Under Nor

2016]

WHY AREN'T YOU WORKING?

219

ask if the injured worker's limitations stemming from his injury affected
"the employee's own ability to compete in the labor market." 39 If those
limitations affected the worker's ability to compete with other, non-injured
individuals in the labor market such that the injured worker was unable to
find employment or was unable to find work that paid him as much as he
earned before getting hurt, then the injured worker met his burden of
proving the injury-related limitations were the cause of his disability.
Injury-related restrictions resulting in diminished earning capacity equaled
disability-without regard to overall economic conditions.
So, for example, in Donnell v. Cone Mills Corp.,40 the court of appeals
rejected an employer's argument that an injured worker with limitations
following his injury was not disabled if he lost his job as a result of a plant
closing:
Our decision does not ignore that [the injured worker's] job with the
[employer] ended because the plant where he worked was closed. But we
do not believe this to be dispositive on the disability issue. The crucial fact
is that [the injured worker's] earning capacity was diminished because he
developed the occupational disease of byssinosis during his employment
with the [employer]. 41
The Donnell court cited Hilliard'sdefinition of disability as governing the
tribunal's inquiry and the injured worker's burden of proof, thereby
interpreting Hilliard as disregarding overall economic conditions when
determining disability. 42 The court of appeals later approvingly cited
Donnell in Preslar v. Cannon Mills Co., 4 3 in which a deceased textile
worker's executrix attempted to collect benefits due under the Act, over the

39. Id. at 805.
40. Donnell v. Cone Mills Corp., 299 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). While it is true
that the court of appeals, and not the supreme court, developed much of the precedent
discussed herein, the court of appeals' decisions are precedent-setting unless and until the
See, e.g., John V. Orth, "Without Precedential
supreme court says otherwise.
Value "-When the Justices of the Supreme Court ofNorth Carolinaare Equally Divided, 93
N.C. L. REv. 1719, 1735-36 (2015) (describing the development of the court of appeals as a
precedent-setting court).
41. Donnell, 299 S.E.2d at 439. The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act was
amended in 1935 to cover so-called occupational diseases. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53
(2015) (enumerating occupational diseases); Murphy v. Am. Enka Corp., 195 S.E. 536,
537-38 (N.C. 1938) (explaining that the legislature amended the Workers' Compensation
Act in 1935 to include occupational diseases). Any difference between occupational
diseases and other kinds of workplace injuries is not relevant to this Article, as the same
definition of disability and the same manner of proving disability applies to both.
42. See Donnell, 299 S.E.2d at 438 (quoting Hilliard's three-pronged definition of
disability).
43. Preslar v. Cannon Mills Co., 343 S.E.2d 209 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
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objection of the employer.4 The employer argued the benefits were not
due to the executrix because the worker had not been disabled as a result of
his admitted occupational lung disease.4 5 In Preslar, the injured worker
retired from employment following twenty-five years of work as a weave
room foreman; the worker then rejoined the employer less than a year
later.46 The worker was thereafter told by a doctor "that he should not
work in a dusty environment" because of decreased pulmonary function,
and he quit his new job four days after returning to work for the
employer.4 7 There was evidence in the record, however, that the worker
quit his job not because of limitations related to his occupational lung
disease but "because he could not meet production." 4 8 While the employer
argued that the worker was not disabled as a result of his occupational lung
disease because he briefly rejoined the employer's workforce before
quitting,4 9 thereby failing to meet the causation prong of the Hilliardtest,
the court concluded that it would "not require the claimant to prove that the
employer's refusal to rehire the defendant was specifically because of the
environmental restriction."so Rather, the court said, "We may assume that,
at a minimum, an employer would not rehire a dust-sensitive former
employee . . . to work in a dusty environment. And this restriction . . may
significantly limit the employability of a long-time textile worker with little
education and no other experience or training."5 1 The court concluded that
restrictions arising from a workplace injury or occupational disease,
combined with factors such as lack of training or other work experience,
are "competent to establish a causal nexus between the occupational
disease and the partial or total inability to earn wages in the same or any
other employment." 5 2 Again, the focus of the disability inquiry was on the

44. See id. at 210.
45. See id. (explaining that the injured worker's widow was attempting to collect
"partial disability compensation" from the employer and that the employer contended that
the deceased worker's admitted occupational disease did not result in any disability prior to
his death).
46. See id. at 211.
47. See id. at 210-11.
48. See id. at 211.
49. See id. at 213 (summarizing the employer's argument as being that "there is no
evidence that [the injured worker's] environmental restriction was the reason [he] was not
rehired for work in a dust-free area").
50. Id. at 214.
5 1. Id
5 2. Id.
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injury- or disease-related limitations and the resulting loss of wage-earning
capacity, with a presumption that such limitations caused disability.53
The court of appeals provided what would become definitive
guidance5 4 on proving disability under Hilliardin Russell v. Lowes Product
55 this guidance never required
Distribution;
an injured worker to consider
or address overall economic conditions. After reiterating that an injured
worker shoulders the burden "to show that he is unable to earn the same
wages he had earned before the injury, either in the same employment or in
other employment," 56 the Russell court identified four ways by which an
injured worker could meet this burden:

(1) the production of medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as
a consequence of the work related injury, incapable of work in any
employment; (2) the production of evidence that he is capable of some
work, but that he has, after a reasonable effort on his part, been
unsuccessful in his effort to obtain employment; (3) the production of
evidence that he is capable of some work but that it would be futile because
of preexisting conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of education, to seek
other employment; or (4) the production of evidence that he has obtained
other employment at a wage less than that earned prior to the injury.57

53. The textile industry provides an interesting context in which to explore the rule
announced in Medlin. Between 1977 and 1997, North Carolina lost approximately 82,000
textile jobs. See North Carolina Textiles, CAROLINA CONTEXT (UNC Center for the Study of
the American South, Program on Public Life, Chapel Hill, N.C.), Jan. 2009, at 2,
http://www.textileconnect.com/documents/resources/carolina-context.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VKJ-2YKD]. The state then lost about 153,000 textile jobs from 1996 to
2006, and another 10,000 in 2007 alone. See id at 3. As demonstrated by Donnell and
Preslar,mill workers not infrequently developed occupational diseases as a result of their
employment. Since the textile industry has now largely collapsed in North Carolina, are
textile workers who suffered workplace injuries or occupational diseases, and who still face
limitations as a result, considered disabled today if, but for the demise of the textile industry,
they would have been able to return to some form of employment within the textile
industry? Application of Medlin could suggest those workers are not disabled. But that
cannot be right, as the law cannot be that the most vulnerable injured workers-those hurt in
a dead or dying industry-are provided less protection under the state's workers'
compensation system than workers hurt in a robust, dynamic industry that is more likely to
be able to accommodate the injured worker's restrictions because the industry's health
creates plentiful jobs in the industry.
54. Definitive, that is, until Medlin. See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760
S.E.2d 732, 737 (N.C. 2014) (stating that Russell "diverged from" the statutory definition of
disability encapsulated by the Hilliardtest). But see id. (stating that the Russell factors are a
proper, though not exclusive, means of proving the first two prongs of disability under
Hilliard).
55. Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distrib., 425 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
56. Id. at 457 (citing Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (N.C. 1982)).
57. Id. (citations omitted).
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Once an injured worker used one of the so-called Russell factors to carry
his burden of proving disability, "the burden of production shift[ed] to the
employer to show 'that suitable jobs [we]re available' and that the
employee [was] capable of obtaining a suitable job 'taking into account
both physical and vocational limitations."' 5 8
Prior to Medlin, the second, third, and fourth of the Russell
factors-all of which address situations in which an injured worker is not
completely precluded from working as a result of injury-related
limitationS 59-allowed an injured worker to prove disability, including
causation under the third Hilliardprong, by demonstrating that he suffered
limitations as a result of his workplace injury and that he was unable to find
employment, or could only find employment at a lesser wage, within those
limitations. 6 0 The focus of the inquiry at that time was the injured worker's
restrictions, without regard to the health of the labor market or economy.
And that was as it should be still: the labor market, whatever its overall
condition, is the same for all workers, injured and healthy. The very idea
behind compensating workers hurt on the job is that, because of their injury
and any resulting limitations, they cannot compete as effectively in the
labor market as non-injured job candidates. For both the injured and the
non-injured, the job market's strength or weakness is a constant, the only
relevant variables being the limitations injured workers experience because
of their on-the-job injuries and the effect of those limitations on their
attractiveness as job candidates. It is by those variables, therefore, that
disability should be-and, prior to Medlin, was-judged, without any
regard to any temporary economic "boom or bust." 6 1
Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court itself approved such an
62
approach when, in Demery v. PerdueFarms, Inc., it summarily affirmed a
court of appeals decision that cited Russell as the proper means by which
an injured worker could meet his burden under Hilliard for proving
58. Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 485, 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)).
59. The first of the Russell factors is probably not relevant to Medlin or this Article's
analysis of Medlin because the rule announced in Medlin applies only when an injured
worker has not been written out of work entirely but instead has been permitted to return to
work under certain limitations or restrictions. The first Russell factor, on the other hand,
addresses the manner by which an injured worker who is written entirely out of work can
prove disability. In that situation, the Medlin court would presumably agree that medical
evidence demonstrating a complete inability to work as a result of an on-the-job injury
would be sufficient to meet all three prongs of Hilliard's definition of disability, including
causation, without ever requiring any consideration of overall economic conditions.
60. See Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distrib., 425 S.E.2d at 765.
61. Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 2014).
62. Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 554 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 2001) (per curiam).
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disability. 63 The supreme court agreed that an inquiry into the injured
worker's ability to compete in the job market, without any reference to
overall economic conditions, was required to prove a worker's disability
was caused by his on-the-job injury. Limitations stemming from his work
injury, coupled with either an inability to find work or an inability to find
work that paid as much as the worker earned before his injury, provided the
necessary causal link between the two. 6 4
Time and again following Russell, the court of appeals used that
decision's formulation to assess disability, and never did the court hold that
an injured worker was required to address whether economic conditions
affected his loss of wage-earning capacity. Rather, the court did the
opposite. Just two years after Russell, the court of appeals in Fletcher v.
Dana Corp.65 determined that the claimant had met the second Russell
factor to prove disability and that the issue before the court was "whether
[the injured worker was] entitled to receive compensation benefits where
his inability to earn the same wages was caused in part by unavailability of
area jobs consistent with his physical limitations."66 To this question, the
Fletcher court gave an unequivocal answer: "an employee who suffers a
work-related injury is not precluded from workers' compensation benefits
when that employee, while employable within limitations in certain kinds
of work, cannot after reasonable efforts obtain employment due to
unavailability of jobs."67 The court pointed out that this rule was supported
by a leading workers' compensation scholar 68 and had been adopted in
other jurisdictions. 6 9 There can be no mistake about the meaning of
Fletcher: overall economic conditions were not relevant to determining

disability.

63. Id.; see Demery, 545 S.E.2d at 490 (applying Russell to determine whether the
claimant proved all three parts of disability as defined in Hilliard). But see Medlin, 760
S.E.2d at 737 (stating that Russell strayed from the statutory definition of "disability" and
that Russell cannot be used to prove the causation prong of disability articulated in Hilliard).

64. See Demery, 554 S.E.2d 337 (affirming the reasoning of the court of appeals in
Demery, 545 S.E.2d 485).
65. Fletcher v. Dana Corp., 459 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. at 37.
68. The court quoted Professor Larson explaining, "The fact that the wage loss comes
about through ... unavailability of employment rather than through incapacity to perform

the work does not change the result [of disability]." Id at 35 (quoting 7 LEx K. LARSON,
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

§

84.01[1], at 84-2 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.

2015)).
69. See id at 35-37 (citing courts in Florida, Michigan, and Maine as reaching the same
conclusion).
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It is not surprising, then, that in Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc.,70 the court
of appeals again rejected an employer's argument that an economic
downturn and the resulting layoff of employees, not injury-related
limitations, was the cause of the worker's loss of wage-earning capacity,
thereby precluding a finding that the employee was disabled.71 The court
wrote that the employer "focused on the wrong issue," explaining that
"while the immediate cause of the loss of [the injured worker's]
wages ... may have been the lay-off, that fact does not preclude a finding
of disability ... if, because of [the worker's] injury, he was incapable of
obtaining a job in the competitive labor market." 72 Again, the disability
inquiry was focused on the worker's limitations, not the economy's
health.
The court of appeals, prior to Medlin, occasionally referenced overall
economic conditions in its analysis of disability claims, but never did the
court conclude that such conditions could affect a claim of disability. The
court in Segovia v. JL. Powell & Co., 74 for example, affirmed a decision of
the Industrial Commission that had rejected a claim of disability by an
injured worker who was laid off because of "a significant decline in
business, which precipitated the layoff of employees" 7 and "[the injured
The Industrial
worker's] lack of interest in returning to work." 76
Commission went so far as to find that the injured worker "sabotage[d]
efforts to find alternative employment." 77 The worker in Segovia had been
released to return to work without any limitations,78 and on that basis
alone-not to mention his bad faith as manifested in the "sabotage" found
by the Industrial Commission 79-he was unable to prove disability, without
any need to consider or address overall economic conditions.8 0
70. Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc., 648 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
71. Id. at 921.
72. Id.
73. See id. (stating that an injured worker proves disability "by offering evidence
consistent with one of the methods of proof set forth in Russell" and that, because the
injured worker presented evidence of impairment of his earning capacity, he met his burden
of proving disability).
74. Segovia v. J.L. Powell & Co., 608 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
75. Id. at 558.
76. Id. at 559.
77. Id.
78. See id at 558.
79. Id. at 559.
80. See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 748 S.E.2d 343, 350 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013) (Geer, J., dissenting) (noting that because the injured worker in Segovia was released
without restrictions, suitable jobs were available to the injured worker, and the injured
worker was uninterested in returning to work, the injured worker was unable to meet the
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Segovia, in other words, did not stand for the proposition that overall
economic conditions could defeat an injured worker's claim of disability.
The court of appeals affirmed this understanding of Segovia in two other
cases: Eudy v. Michelin North America, Inc.,' in which the court
emphasized that the worker in Segovia failed to prove disability because he
expressed a "lack of interest in returning to work"; 82 and Graham v.
Masonry Reinforcing Corp. ofAmerica,8 which noted that the employee in
Segovia had been cleared to return to work without restrictions, thereby
precluding a showing of disability. 84 In Segovia, Eudy, and Graham, then,
the court of appeals made clear that economic conditions were not part of
the disability inquiry.
The law, therefore, was well-established before Medlin: an injured
worker who proved that he suffered limitations as a result of a workplace
injury and was thereafter unable to earn wages met his burden of proving
disability under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Overall
economic conditions and the strength or weakness of the labor market were
never relevant to the analysis. Medlin would change this.
B.

Workers' Compensation Law After Medlin

Claude Medlin began working in the commercial construction
industry after graduating from North Carolina State University in 1974
with a degree in civil engineering. He started working for Weaver Cooke
Construction in 2006 and held positions there as a project manager and an
estimator.8 6 Medlin injured his shoulder at work in May 2008 and
continued to work for Weaver Cooke Construction until November 2008
"when he was terminated as part of widespread layoffs both within the
company, and within the construction industry as a whole." 87 Medlin's
employer thereafter accepted his injury as compensable, providing medical

burden of proving disability under Russell, without regard to overall economic conditions),
aff'd, 760 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 2014).
81. Eudy v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 645 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
82. See id. at 89 (citing Segovia, 608 S.E.2d at 558-59).
83. Graham v. Masonry Reinforcing Corp. of Am., 656 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
84. See id. at 680-81 ("[E]ven assuming arguendo that [the injured worker] was
terminated for an economic downturn, this would not preclude a finding that [the injured
worker] was disabled and thus eligible to receive indemnity benefits during the term of his
disability." (citing Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc., 648 S.E.2d 917, 921 (2007))).
85. See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732, 733 (N.C. 2014).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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care and paying wage-replacement benefits beginning in February 2009.88
Also in February 2009, Medlin underwent shoulder surgery and started
physical therapy.89 Medlin's therapy was halted in April 2009 when he
began to complain of increased pain in his shoulder; an MRI done in late
2009 showed Medlin suffered from a superior labral tear to his shoulder. 90
Concluding that the tear was not related to Medlin's work injury because it
was not present when shoulder surgery was performed earlier that year,
Medlin's doctors declared him to be at maximum medical improvement for
his work injuries and released him from their care with permanent work
restrictions that included not lifting more than ten pounds, not climbing
ladders, and not performing repetitive overhead activities.91

88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 733-34.
91. See id at 734. With one inexplicable exception, every tribunal to consider Medlin's
claim consistently concluded that the permanent work restrictions imposed by his doctors
were the result of his workplace injury. See Opinion and Award by Philip A. Baddour III at
5, Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 2014) (I.C. No. 128568),
http://www.ic.nc.gov/livelink/livelink.exe?func=ll&objaction=overview&objid=207401
(stating that the claimant's authorized physician imposed work restrictions of lifting
limitations to under ten pounds and proscribed repetitive overhead activities); Opinion and
Award by Danny Lee McDonald at *3, Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d
732 (N.C. 2014) (I.C. No. 128568), 2012 WL 5266012, at *3 (stating the same); Medlin v.
Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 748 S.E.2d 343, 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that
claimant's authorized physician imposed permanent work restrictions that included not
lifting more than ten pounds, not climbing ladders, and not performing repetitive overhead
activities), aff'd, 760 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 2014). The exception to this consistent conclusion
can be found at the end of the supreme court's opinion in Medlin. After discussing at length
the interplay of disability and overall economic conditions in the workers' compensation
system (a discussion the necessity of which was predicated on Medlin's restrictions being
injury-related), the court wrote that the factual findings made by the Full Commission
"establish, among other things, that any limitations because of a superior labral tear were
likely not caused by [Medlin's] work-related injury." Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr.,
LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 2014). This observation by the court is inexplicable for
two reasons. First, the Full Commission did not find that any limitations Medlin suffered
were unrelated to his work injury, so there is no such finding for the court to uphold.
Second, if this finding had, in fact, been made by the Full Commission, Medlin's claim of
disability would have failed on well-established grounds that if a claimant suffers no
restrictions as a result of his work injury, then he cannot make a showing of disability. See,
e.g., Segovia v. J.L. Powell & Co., 608 S.E.2d 557, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
the Full Commission properly concluded the claimant was not disabled because he was
released by his doctor without any restrictions). That would have rendered unnecessary the
discussion of disability and economics undertaken in the opinions issued by the deputy
commissioner, Full Commission, court of appeals, and supreme court. It is untenable to
maintain that four separate tribunals, including the supreme court itself, undertook such an
unnecessary discussion.
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Medlin sought employment in the construction industry following his
layoff in November 2008, testifying that he made hundreds of job inquiries
while trying to find work equivalent to his pre-injury position. 92 None
were successful, and Medlin remained jobless.93 In December 2010, while
Medlin was out of work and receiving wage-replacement benefits, his
employer filed an application with the Industrial Commission to terminate
payment of those benefits on the grounds that Medlin "could not show that
he was legally disabled because his inability to find another position as an
estimator was due to the economic downturn, rather than to any physical
limitations." 9 4 A deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission
concluded in May 2011 that Medlin had not proved he was disabled, 95 and
Medlin appealed to the Full Commission. 9 6 The Full Commission found
that Medlin had, in fact, sought employment following his layoff.97 Based
on the testimony of a vocational expert who testified at the hearing, the Full
Commission also found that the job of estimator, which Medlin had held
with his employer and had sought with new employers following his layoff,
was within Medlin's physical limitations. 98 Finally, the Full Commission
noted that the vocational expert testified that Medlin would be able to
return to the job of estimator "but for the current economic downturn." 99
The Full Commission, in affirming the deputy commissioner, concluded
that an injured worker "is unable to meet [his] burden of proving disability
where, but for economic factors, the employee is capable of returning to his
pre-injury position" 00 and that Medlin could have returned to work as an
estimator "but for the current economic downturn affecting both [Medlin's
former employer] as well as the construction industry as a whole."' 0 A
bad economy trumped injury-related limitations that diminished
wage-earning capacity, according to the Full Commission.1 0 2
Medlin appealed the Full Commission's decision to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Full Commission's decision

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 345.
See id.
Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 734.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 346.
Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by a split vote. 0 3 The majority at the court of appeals found that Medlin
"failed to show any causal connection between his injury and subsequent
wage loss,"lI04 thereby failing to meet his burden of proving disability under
Hilliard.05 Rather, the majority reasoned, "the uncontested findings of fact
establish that [Medlin's] inability to earn his pre-injury wages is not
attributable to his injury but is based solely on the large-scale economic
downturn affecting the construction industry as a whole."' 06 The court
interpreted Segovia, just as the Full Commission had,1 0 7 as standing for the
proposition that when the Commission finds as fact that overall economic
conditions cause an injured worker's loss of wage-earning capacity, such a
finding can properly support the legal conclusion that the worker is not
disabled and, therefore, not eligible for wage-replacement benefits.' 0 8 The
majority also distinguished Eudy and Graham on the ground that in those
cases the injured workers could not perform their pre-injury jobs as a result
of their restrictions, whereas Medlin was capable of doing so.109
This was all too much for the dissent at the court of appeals.
According to the dissent, the majority was simply wrong about the injured
worker in Graham: he was, just like Medlin, able to return to his pre-injury
job."o More generally, "[w]hile the majority opinion attempt[ed] to

103. Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 347 (affirming the decision of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission).
104. Id. at 346.
105. See id at 345-46.
106. Id. at 347. Appellate court review of the Full Commission's decisions "is limited to
consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact
and whether the findings support the Commission's conclusions of law. This Court's duty
goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to
support the finding." Id. at 345 (quoting Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 669
S.E.2d 582, 584 (N.C. 2008)). Additionally, when "findings of fact are not challenged [on
appeal] and do not concern jurisdiction, they are binding on appeal." Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at
738. "The Commission's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo" by the appellate courts.
Id.
107. See Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 346-47 (citing the Full Commission's reliance on
Segovia in concluding that Medlin's loss of wages "is not attributable to his injury but is
based solely on the large-scale economic downturn affecting the construction industry as a
whole").
108. See id. at 347 (concluding that the Full Commission did not err when it relied on
Segovia to conclude Medlin failed to prove disability).
109. See id
110. See id at 351 (Geer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority opinion incorrectly
states that the laid off employee in Graham was not physically capable of performing his
former job and, for that reason, sought different work" and reciting the employer's argument
in Graham that the injured worker "was fired because of 'economics' and poor job
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distinguish Eudy and Graham factually, it never addresse[d] those
opinions' discussion of Segovia or the language in the actual Segovia
opinion limiting its holding."'
The dissent argued that the majority's
reading of Segovia was too broad because the injured worker there was not
simply unable to find work because of a weak jobs market, but failed to
prove disability through the Russell framework because he expressed a lack
of interest in returning to work and "sabotage[d] efforts to find alternative
employment." 1 l2 Additionally, the dissent noted that in Eudy, the court had
already rejected an interpretation of Segovia as standing for the proposition
that an injured worker was not disabled if the reason for his loss of wages
was an overall economic downturn. 1 3 The dissent also pointed to
Britt-which the majority never discussed-and Graham as standing for
the rule that when an injured worker retains some sort of limitation as a
result of his workplace injury, poor economic conditions or a weak jobs
market cannot insulate an employer from the obligation to pay
wage-replacement benefits if the injured worker cannot find a job.1 14 The
dissent also noted the court's decision in Demery," 5 which relied on the
Russell framework to assess whether an employee met his burden of
proving disability under Hilliard;this case, which did not assess economic
factors, was summarily affirmed by the supreme court, making it binding
precedent. 116
The dissent concluded, "It is too simplistic, to assume, as the
Commission did and the majority opinion does, that in a down economy, an
employable employee with restrictions cannot show that his difficulties in
performance") (citing Graham v. Masonry Reinforcing Corp. of Am., 656 S.E.2d 676, 678
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008)).
111. Id.
112. Id at 349-50 (quoting Segovia v. J.L. Powell & Co., 608 S.E.2d 557, 559 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004)); see also supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
113. See Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 349-50 (stating that the injured worker in Segovia was
unable to meet his burden under any of the Russell factors and that the case could not be
read as standing for the "sweeping proposition" that an employee is unable to prove
disability if the cause of his wage loss is overall economic conditions); see also supra notes
73-74 and accompanying text.
114. Medlin, 748 S.E.2d at 350 ("While the immediate cause of the loss of [the injured
worker's] wages . . may have been the lay-off, that fact does not preclude a finding of
disability.... [A]n injured employee's earning capacity is determined by the employee's
own ability to compete in the labor market. Thus, the fact that [the injured worker] was laid
off does not preclude a finding of total disability if, because of [the worker's] injury, he was
incapable of obtaining a job in the competitive labor market." (quoting Graham, 656 S.E.2d
at 680-81)).
115. See id. at 348 (noting that the majority "overlook[ed]" Demery).
116. See id. at 349 (stating that "Demery, because it was affirmed by the supreme court,
is controlling").
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obtaining another job are due to his injury." 17 The court, the dissent
argued, "should recognize not only (1) that the prospective employers may
well choose an applicant without restrictions, but also (2) that an employee
is unlikely to be able to prove that he lost out on the job because of his
restrictions."' 18 Therein lay the twin faults of the majority's decision.
First, substantively, the opinion ran counter to the longstanding, sound rule
that it is an employee's limitations and their effect on wage-earning
capacity-not the condition of the jobs market-that is the relevant
standard for determining disability. Second, the opinion provided no
evidentiary guidance to injured workers who must carry the burden of
proving disability.
Both of these faults recurred on appeal to the North Carolina Supreme
Court, when the court unanimously affirmed the court of appeals. 1 9 When
it decided the case, the supreme court first reaffirmed the three-part test for
disability outlined in Hilliardand explained that Hilliard's explication of
disability "was grounded explicitly in the statutory definition of
disability."l 20 The same could not be said, according to the court, for the
Russell framework crafted by the court of appeals, which the court said
"expanded upon, and perhaps diverged from, that grounding."'21 The
supreme court explained that the split decision in the court of appeals was a
result of that lower court's previous inconsistent application of Russell:
some decisions held that meeting one of the Russell factors satisfied all
three prongs of disability identified in Hilliard, and other decisions held
that the Russell framework could properly be used to satisfy only the first
two prongs of Hilliard's definition of disability, with additional proof
necessary to prove the causal link between injury-related limitations and
depressed earning capacity.1 2 2 This latter interpretation was the correct
117. Id. at 352.
118. Id.
119. See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 2014)
(affirming the decision by the court of appeals).
120. Id. at 737.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 736-37. A review of the cases cited by the supreme court suggests this
conclusion is incorrect. The court's opinion cited four cases to illustrate that the court of
appeals would sometimes allow a claimant to prove all three prongs of Hilliard'sdefinition
of disability by meeting one of the four Russell factors.
See id. at 737 (citing
Campos-Brizuela v. Rocha Masonry, L.L.C., 716 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), Nobles
v. Coastal Power & Elec., Inc., 701 S.E.2d 316 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010), Barrett v. All Payment
Servs., Inc., 686 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), and Boylan v. Verizon Wireless, 685
S.E.2d 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)). The court quoted material from each of these cases
suggesting that meeting one of the four Russell factors satisfied the three prongs of disability
articulated in Hilliard. See id. On this point, then, the court was correct. The same cannot
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one, according to the Medlin court.1 2 3 The Russell framework provided a
proper, though not exclusive, means of proving only the first two prongs of
disability recited in Hilliard: depressed earning capacity in either the same

be said of the court's conclusion that other panels of the court of appeals had held that
meeting one of the Russell factors met only the first two prongs of disability articulated in
Hilliard, with additional proof needed to satisfy the causation element in Hilliard's
definition. For this proposition, the court cited three cases. Id. at 736-37 (citing Helfrich v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 741 S.E.2d 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), Heatherly v.
Hollingsworth, 712 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), and Graham v. Masonry Reinforcing
Corp. of Am., 656 S.E.2d 676, 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)). In each of these cases, the court
of appealssaid that Russell would satisfy only the first two prongs of Hilliard'sdefinition of
disability. See Helfrich, 741 S.E.2d at 413 ("A[n injured worker] may satisfy the first two
prongs of the Hilliardtest through [proving one of the Russell prongs.]"); Heatherly, 712
S.E.2d at 352-53 ("A[n injured worker] may establish the first two elements through any
one of four methods of proof [from Russell.]"); Graham, 656 S.E.2d at 679 ("This Court has
stated a claimant may prove the first two prongs of Hilliardthrough [proving one of the
Russell prongs.]"). A closer look at each of these cases, though, reveals that what the court
of appeals said it was doing differed from what the court of appeals, in fact, did. In
Helfrich, for example, there was no evidence regarding the cause of disability other than the
fact that the injured worker was hurt at work and suffered limitations as a result of that
injury, which resulted in a loss of wage-earning capacity. See Helfrich, 741 S.E.2d at 413
(affirming the Commission's conclusion that the injured worker was disabled without citing
any facts other than the Commission's findings that the worker suffered two on-the-job
injuries that resulted in limitations that affected his wage-earning capacity). So, too, in
Heatherly. There, in affirming a finding of disability, the court recited the Commission's
findings that the injured worker had suffered a "possible lightning strike" and, as a result,
was unable to work. See Heatherly, 712 S.E.2d at 353 (affirming the finding of disability
based on the occurrence of a workplace injury and the resulting inability to earn wages). No
other cause of disability was discussed. Id The court in Heatherly also arguably
contradicted itself by saying, on the one hand, that Russell could be used to prove only the
first two prongs of Hilliard, see id. at 352-53, but later stating that "a plaintiffs testimony
regarding his or her pain and its effect on plaintiff's ability to work is sufficient to support a
determination of disability under Russell's first method of proof." Id. at 354. And in
Graham, the court again cited nothing but the findings of an on-the-job injury and
consequent limitations, resulting in loss of wage-earning capacity, to affirm a conclusion of
disability. See Graham, 656 S.E.2d 676, 679-80 (stating that there was "competent
evidence" in the form of an inability to secure employment, and thereby earn wages,
following a workplace injury that resulted in limitations). Like the Heatherly court, the
court in Graham also seemed to contradict itself by stating both that Russell could be used
to satisfy only the first two Hilliardprongs, see id at 679, but later noting that the Industrial
Commission properly found the injured worker "had proven his disability" by resorting to
the third Russell test. Id. at 680. It is far from clear, in other words, that the court of appeals
actually required injured workers in this line of cases to do anything other than meet one of
the Russell factors to satisfy the definition of disability articulated in Hilliard. Rather, it
appears that the court of appeals, in the cases cited by the supreme court, understood Russell
to be a means of proving Hilliardin toto, even if the court of appeals claimed otherwise.
123. Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 736-37.
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or different employment after a workplace injury.1 2 4 In addition, the court
said, "a claimant must also satisfy the third element, as articulated in
Hilliard, by proving that his inability to obtain equally well-paying work is
because of his work-related injury."l 25 As for Demery, in which the
supreme court had summarily affirmed a decision of the court of appeals
that concluded that using one of the Russell factors proved disability under
Hilliard,the Medlin court held that the facts of Demery implicated only the
first Russell factor--complete inability to work following a workplace
injury-and that discussion of the remaining Russell factors was
unnecessary to decide the case, making such discussion dicta.1 26 in
summary, the Medlin court explained:
Because the focus [of the disability inquiry] is on earning capacity, broad
economic conditions, as well as the circumstances of particular markets and
occupations, are undoubtedly relevant to whether a claimant's inability to
find equally lucrative work was because of a work-related injury. Whether
in a boom or bust economy, a claimant's inability to find equally lucrative
work is a function of both economic conditions and his specific limitations.
Both factors necessarily determine whether a specific claimant is able to
127
obtain employment that pays as well as his previous position . .
Whereas overall economic conditions were never relevant to disability
before Medlin, such was no longer the case. Left unaddressed by the court
was when or how such conditions were relevant, the court only offering
that "the [Industrial] Commission makes this determination based on the
evidence in the individual case,"l28 which is to say the court offered no
guidance at all. The court concluded that Medlin had not met his burden of
proving "that his inability to find equally lucrative work [was] because of
his work-related injury."l29 The supreme court, therefore, affirmed the
lower court's denial of Medlin's claim for wage-replacement benefits,1 3 0
thereby adopting a new substantive rule regarding the relevant components
of disability. This rule established that the strength or weakness of the
overall economy, particular markets, and specific occupations at least
sometimes must be addressed before disability can be established; the court
announced this without providing any meaningful guidance as to when or
how an injured worker might be required to make an evidentiary showing
under this new rule.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id at 737.
Id.
See id. at 737 n.1.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 738.
Id.
See id (affirming the decision of the court of appeals).
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THE PROOF REQUIRED FOR DISABILITY AFTER MEDLIN

Broad economic conditions are relevant to determining an injured
worker's disability after Medlin."' About this, the supreme court was
clear.
The court was not clear-indeed, the court said virtually
nothing-about when or how an injured worker might be required to
account for such conditions when trying to prove disability. The Medlin
court stated only that "the [Industrial] Commission makes this
determination based on the evidence in the individual case."1 32 This is a
serious omission from the court's opinion, and one this Article seeks to fill.
As the supreme court reiterated in Medlin, "The burden of proving the
existence and extent of a disability is generally carried by the claimant."133
Under Hilliard, the injured worker bears the burden of persuading the
Commission that he is incapable of earning his pre-injury wages in either
the same or different employment and that his inability to do so is because
of his workplace injury.1 34 Prior to Medlin, the court of appeals used the
Russell framework to assess all three prongs of Hilliard's definition of
disability. 135 In practical terms, that meant a worker could meet his burden
by proving that he was injured at work, suffered limitations as a result of
that injury, and lost wages following his injury despite efforts to find work.
The overall strength or weakness of the economy was not relevant to the
inquiry, and about it the injured worker could always be unconcerned.1 36
Now, though, the supreme court has made clear that the Russell framework
cannot be used to prove causation under Hilliardand that the question of

131. See id. (concluding that "a claimant's inability to find equally lucrative work [after
an on-the-job injury] is a function of both economic conditions and his specific
limitations").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 736.
134. See id
135. See id. at 737 (citing cases in which the court of appeals did so); see also Demery v.
Perdue Farms, Inc., 554 S.E.2d 337, 337 (N.C. 2001) (summarily affirming a court of
appeals decision that used Russell to prove disability under Hilliard); Medlin v. Weaver
Cooke Constr., LLC, 748 S.E.2d 343, 348 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (Geer, J., dissenting) ("In
other words, to prove 'disability'-which encompasses both incapacity and causation, as
Hilliardholds-the employee must meet one of the prongs of Russell."), aff'd, 760 S.E.2d
732 (N.C. 2014).
136. See Russell v. Lowes Product Distrib., 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(outlining four methods of proving disability, none of which address overall economic
conditions); see also, e.g., Fletcher v. Dana Corp., 459 S.E.2d 31, 37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding "an employee who suffers a work-related injury is not precluded from workers'
compensation benefits when that employee, while employable within limitations in certain
kinds of work, cannot after reasonable efforts obtain employment due to unavailability of
jobs.").
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causation encompasses not only consideration of how an injured worker's
injury-related limitations affect his wage-earning capacity, but sometimes
also involves consideration of larger economic conditions.
The injured worker therefore faces a practical difficulty following
Medlin: when must he address overall economic conditions as part of his
case for disability? Further, when he is required to do so, how can he prove
that his loss of wage-earning capacity is caused by his injury and not the
overall condition of the economy? This Article argues that the answer lies
in a burden-shifting framework. Under this proposed burden-shifting
framework, the injured worker would first be required to produce evidence
that he was hurt at work, suffered limitations as a result of his injury, and
lost wage-earning capacity following his injury; this is the same showing a
worker was required to make before Medlin. Then, under this framework,
the burden of production would shift to the employer to produce evidence,
if it so desired, that the injured worker's loss of wage-earning capacity was
due not to his work injury, but to the condition of the economy or the
injured worker's occupation. If the employer produces no evidence when
this burden of production shifts to it, then the injured worker has met his
burden of proving disability under Hilliard, without any need to address the
health of the overall economy and any effect it had on the worker's
wage-eaming capacity. Only when the employer produces sufficient
evidence that overall economic conditions caused the injured worker's loss
of wage-earning capacity would the burden of production shift back to the
injured worker. The injured worker would then produce evidence to rebut
the employer's showing that his loss of wage-earning capacity was due not
to the work injury, but to economic conditions. If the employee fails to
persuasively rebut the employer's evidence, then the employee will have
failed to meet his burden of proving disability under Hilliard.
This burden-shifting framework is consistent with the Medlin court's
holding that the substantive definition of disability must account for both
an injured worker's limitations and the overall health of the economy, but
the framework also provides a manageable, practical means by which
workers and employers can make their cases before the Industrial
Commission.137 Indeed, this framework is consistent with what happened
137. Id. at 736. This burden-shifting framework should not be considered an affirmative
defense to a claim of disability. As the Medlin court reaffirmed, the burden of proving
disability lies with the claimant. See id. ("The burden of proving the existence and extent of
a disability is generally carried by the claimant."). And, the Medlin court explained,
showing that a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity is due to injury-related limitations is
part of the definition of disability. See id. at 737 (stating that a claimant must prove "that
his inability to obtain equally well-paying work is because of his work-related injury").
Affirmative defenses, however, impose a burden of persuasion on those parties raising them.
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in Medlin.138 Medlin met his burden of showing he was hurt at work,
suffered limitations as a result of his injury, and lost wage-earning capacity
while so limited.1 39 Then, the employer produced testimony from a
vocational expert that it was not Medlin's injury-related limitations, but the
condition of the economy and the construction industry, that caused
Medlin's loss of wage-earning capacity.140 In answer to this, Medlin
offered no rebuttal.141 Thus, he failed to prove disability under the rule
announced in Medlin.14 2
See, e.g., Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Servs., LLC, 723 S.E.2d 744,
749 (N.C. 2012) (stating that the defendant "bears the burden of proof on its affirmative
defense"). Under Medlin, then, it would be inappropriate to consider this Article's proposed
burden-shifting framework as establishing an affirmative defense. Rather, consistent with
Medlin, the burden of persuasion remains on the injured worker at all times, with only a
burden of production shifting to the employer who wishes to argue that economic factors are
the cause of a claimant's loss of wage-earning capacity. As the North Carolina Supreme
Court long ago explained, there is a difference between the burden of persuasion and the
burden of production:
[They] are two very different things. The former remains on the party affirming a
fact in support of his case, and does not change at any time throughout the trial.
The latter may shift from side to side as the case progresses, according to the
nature and strength of the proofs offered in support or denial of the main fact to be
established.
Speas v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 125 S.E. 398, 401 (N.C. 1924).
138. While Medlin is ostensibly about the role economic conditions play in assessing
disability, the case is arguably about something much broader: the idea of causation in the
workers' compensation system. The Medlin court's decision could be interpreted as
requiring a worker to show his injury was the sole cause of lost wages to prove disability.
Such an interpretation would be erroneous, however, because it is well-established that
causation in workers' compensation claims track the concept of proximate causation that
animates tort law, namely that a workplace injury need only be a cause of injury, not the
cause of injury, to establish compensability and disability. See, e.g., Roberts v. Burlington
Indus., 364 S.E.2d 417, 423 (N.C. 1988) ("Under [the 'increased risk'] approach, the injury
arises out of the employment if a risk to which the employee was exposed because of the
nature of the employment was a contributing proximate cause of the injury . . . ." (emphasis
added)); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (N.C. 1981) ("In workers'
compensation actions the rule of causation is that where the right to recover is based on
injury by accident, the employment need not be the sole causative force to render an injury
compensable."); Gilmore v. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 23 S.E.2d 292, 296 (N.C. 1942) ("And
to establish a real relation of cause and effect between an injury to, and subsequent death of
employee, the evidence must be such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and
remote possibility, that is, there must be sufficient competent evidence tending to show a
proximate causal relation between the injury and subsequent death." (emphasis added)).
There is no reason to interpret Medlin as abandoning this long-established rule sub silentio.
139. See Medlin, 760 S.E.2d at 734-35.
140. See id. at 735.
141. See id. at 738 (stating that Medlin challenged only a single finding of fact on appeal
regarding the job requirements of an estimator). Medlin's failure to rebut the vocational
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The courts already use such a burden-shifting framework in several
contexts in North Carolina's workers' compensation system, such as when
an employer disputes the existence of an injured worker's disability and a
hearing is required to decide the question.1 4 3 While "the claimant has the
initial burden of proving that his/her wage earning capacity has been
impaired by injury[,]"144 the burden of production, after the claimant makes
this showing, shifts to the employer to "come forward with evidence to
show not only that suitable jobs are available, but also that the [injured
worker] is capable of getting one, taking into account both physical and
expert is understandable. Prior to the supreme court's decision in Medlin, there was no case
law in North Carolina that allowed an employer to avoid payment of wage-replacement
benefits on the ground that overall economic conditions, and not an injured worker's
limitations, were the cause of an injured worker's loss of wage-earning capacity. Medlin
could not reasonably be expected to produce evidence at hearing to meet a legal standard
that did not exist at the time of hearing.
142. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has yet to decide another case with facts
like those in Medlin, that is, a case in which an injured worker suffers from work restrictions
following a workplace injury and the employer alleges that overall economic conditions,
and not the worker's injury-related restrictions, are causing the worker's loss of
wage-eaming capacity. The court of appeals, therefore, has not yet had an opportunity to
apply Medlin in the manner advocated in this Article in circumstances like those present in
Medlin. The closest the court has come was in the unpublished decision in Ellis v. Key City
Furniture, Inc., No. COAl5-78, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 693 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2015).
In Ellis, the claimant was injured at work in 2008 and 2010. See id at *2-*3. Then, in
2012, the injured worker "lost her job as a result of company-wide layoffs." Id. at *4. The
injured worker in Ellis, unlike the injured worker in Medlin, "offered no evidence that
limitations from her injury affected her ability to find work, especially considering that she
had been released to work without restriction by three physicians who examined her." Id. at
*12. Economic conditions were therefore irrelevant to the court's analysis, as the injured
worker failed to make the threshold showing that her workplace injury somehow diminished
her wage-earning capacity. Though the Ellis court cited to Medlin's discussion of the
interplay between disability and economics, the same result-a denial of benefits for failure
to prove disability-would have been reached in Ellis under the law as it existed before
Medlin. In any event, the opinion in Ellis has no precedential value. See N.C. R. App. P.
30(e)(3) (stating that an unpublished opinion "does not constitute controlling legal
authority"). Published decisions by the court of appeals citing Medlin did so for reasons
unrelated to Medlin's discussion of the relationship between disability and economics. See
Fields v. H & E Equip. Servs., LLC, 771 S.E.2d 791, 794 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that
Medlin reaffirmed that a claimant must prove all three prongs of the disability test first
articulated in Hilliard); Ademovic v. Taxi USA, LLC, 767 S.E.2d 571, 577 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014) (citing Medlin's recitation of the standard of review used to assess the Full
Commission's findings of fact); Tedder v. A & K Enters. 767 S.E.2d 98, 104 (N.C. Ct. App.
2014) (noting Medlin's affirmation of the three-part test for disability established in
Hilliard); Philbeck v. Univ. of Mich., 761 S.E.2d 668, 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (citing
Medlin's explication of Russell).
143. Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
144. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss2/3

26

Roessler: Why Aren't You Working? Medlin with Proof of Disability Under Nor
2016]

WHY AREN'T YOU WORKING?

237

vocational limitations."1 45 Absent such a showing by the employer, the
injured worker will have met his burden of proving disability.146 If the
employer does make such a showing, "the employee may 'produc[e]
evidence that either contests the availability of other jobs or [her] suitability
for those jobs, or establishes that [she] has unsuccessfully
sought the
1 47
employment opportunities located by [her] employer."'
A burden-shifting framework is also used when an injured worker and
employer enter into an agreement that the worker is disabled and the
Industrial Commission enters an order approving the agreement, at which
time "a presumption of disability attaches in favor of the employee." 4 8
Once "the presumption attaches, 'the burden shifts to [the employer] to
show that [the injured worker] is employable."'l 4 9 If the employer later
145. Id.
146. See id. (stating that the employer "failed to do so" and affirming the award of
disability benefits).
147. Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 472 S.E.2d 382, 386 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Burwell v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
The court of appeals has sometimes described the Russell framework itself as a
burden-shifting mechanism. See Demery v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 485, 490 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2001) (stating that "[o]nce an employee meets her initial burden of production
[under Russell], the burden of production shifts to the employer to show 'that suitable jobs
are available' and that the employee is capable of obtaining a suitable job 'taking into
account both physical and vocational limitations"' (quoting Kennedy, 398 S.E.2d at 682)).
If the Demery court accurately described Russell, the burden-shifting framework proposed
in this Article could be fairly characterized as, at least in part, Russell-plus: an injured
worker could prove disability via one of the four Russell factors, with an obligation to
produce evidence regarding economic conditions only if the employer does so first. Of
course, as Medlin made clear, the Russell factors are not the exclusive means of proving the
first two prongs of disability. See Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 760 S.E.2d 732,
737 (N.C. 2014) ("[T]hese methods are neither statutory nor exhaustive.").
148. Saums v. Raleigh Cmty. Hosp., 487 S.E.2d 746, 749 (N.C. 1997).
149. Id. at 749 (quoting Dalton v. Anvil Knitwear, 458 S.E.2d 251, 257 (N.C. Ct. App.
1995)); see also Smith v. Sealed Air Corp., 489 S.E.2d 445, 446-47 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that when the Industrial Commission has approved an agreement between the
parties that the injured worker is disabled, "the employee is entitled to a presumption of
continuing disability" and that "it is incumbent upon the employer to come forward with
evidence that suitable jobs are available to the employee"); Kennedy, 398 S.E.2d at 682
(stating that "once the claimant meets [his] initial burden [of proving disability], the
[employer] who claims that the [injured worker] is capable of earning wages must come
forward with evidence to show not only that suitable jobs are available, but also that the
[injured worker] is capable of getting one, taking into account both physical and vocational
limitations" and "referring to the [employer's] burden of rebutting the [injured worker's]
initial showing of a continuing disability"). Whether these cases' discussions of shifting
burdens relate to burdens of production or burdens of persuasion is irrelevant to the point
made here: use of a burden-shifting framework to implement Medlin would be a task with
which our courts are familiar. That these cases may address burdens of persuasion, and not
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alleges the worker is no longer disabled, "[t]he claimant need not present
evidence at the hearing [to determine ongoing disability] unless the
employer ... presents evidence showing both that suitable jobs are
available, and that the claimant is capable of getting one, taking into
account the claimant's limitations." 1 Just as an employee is under no
obligation to present evidence of ongoing disability in this scenario unless
the employer presents evidence that suitable jobs are available, this
Article's proposed burden-shifting framework would require an injured
worker to present evidence that his loss of wage-earning capacity is not due
to overall economic conditions only if the employer first presents evidence
that this is, in fact, the case. In cases in which the employer does not put
into play the issue of overall economic conditions and their effect on
disability, such conditions will be irrelevant. 5 1
So, too, is a burden-shifting framework used when an employee
suffers limitations as a result of his workplace injury, returns to work, and
is thereafter terminated for misconduct.1 5 2 Generally, the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act provides that an injured worker forfeits his
right to wage-replacement benefits if he "refuses suitable employment." 153
In Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, the court of appeals concluded
that termination of an injured employee for misconduct or fault "does not
automatically constitute a constructive refusal to accept employment so as
to bar the employee from receiving [wage-replacement] benefits .... "1 54
Instead, "the test is whether the employee's loss of, or diminution in, wages
is attributable to the wrongful act resulting in loss of employment .. . or
whether such loss or diminution in earning capacity is due to the
employee's work-related disability . . . ."'

not due; if the latter, they are.1

56

If the former, then benefits are

A burden-shifting framework is employed

production, is not to say the burden-shifting framework proposed here relates to the burden
of persuasion. It does not. See supra note 137 (explaining that Medlin reaffirmed that the
injured worker generally retains the burden of persuasion in workers' compensation claims
and that the burden-shifting framework proposed here therefore relates to the burden of
production, not persuasion).
150. Moore v. Concrete Supply Co., 561 S.E.2d 315, 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
151. The burden-shifting framework proposed here need not be approached or applied
mechanically. An injured worker, if he so chooses, may present evidence in his
case-in-chief to presumptively rebut any evidence his employer may present in support of
the argument that economic conditions, and not the injured worker's restrictions, are causing
the worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
152. Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 472 S.E.2d 397, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-32 (2015).
154. Seagraves, 472 S.E.2d at 401.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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to decide this question. First, "the employer must ... show that the
employee was terminated for misconduct or fault, unrelated to the
compensable injury, for which a nondisabled employee would ordinarily
have been terminated."' 57 If the employer makes this showing, then the
worker's termination will be deemed a constructive refusal to accept
suitable employment, barring the worker from collecting wage-replacement
benefits "unless the employee is then able to show that his or her inability
to find or hold other employment of any kind, or other employment at a
wage comparable to that earned prior to the injury, is due to the
work-related disability." 58 Because the employer in Seagraves raised and
alleged a fact that would disqualify the injured worker from
wage-replacement
benefits-in
that case,
misconduct justifying
termination-the court reasonably concluded that the employer bore the
burden of production on that issue, just as would be required under this
Article's proposed burden-shifting framework when the employer offers
evidence that economic conditions, and not injury-related limitations, are
causing a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity. The supreme court later
endorsed the burden-shifting framework established in Seagraves, noting
that "the test provides a forum of inquiry that guides a fact finder through
the relevant circumstances in order to resolve the ultimate issue"159 of
whether the terminated worker's loss of wage-earning capacity was due to
his injury or his misconduct. "As such," the court wrote, "we conclude that
this test is an appropriate means to decide cases of this nature." 60 For the
same reasons-namely, workability and practicality-a burden-shifting
framework should govern post-Medlin allegations that economic
conditions, and not injury-related limitations, are the cause of an injured
worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
Burden-shifting frameworks, then, are common in North Carolina's
workers' compensation system, and using one to apply Medlin would
respect precedent,' provide legal rules that are workable, 62 and honor the
purpose of the state's workers' compensation laws.1 6 3

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (N.C. 2004).
Id.

161.

See supra Part I-A.

162. See McRae, 597 S.E.2d at 700 (describing a burden-shifting framework as
"provid[ing] a forum of inquiry that guides a fact finder through the relevant circumstances
in order to resolve the ultimate issue").

163. See Hartsell v. Thermoid Co., 107 S.E.2d 115, 118 (N.C. 1959) ("The Workmen's
Compensation Act is primarily for the protection and benefit of the employee . . . .");
Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 154 S.E. 66, 67 (N.C. 1930) (stating that the
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CONCLUSION

North Carolina adopted its workers' compensation system to provide
ready relief to workers hurt on the job. The law reflected a compromise:
workers would receive prompt relief from on-the-job injuries, and
employers would get the benefit .of limited liability. It was a compromise,
in essence, to spread the costs and risks of a modem economy. In the wake
of Medlin, another compromise is in order. Under the state's workers'
compensation laws, injured workers generally retain the ultimate burden of
proving they are disabled as a result of a workplace injury. It is also true
that in a variety of circumstances, the burden of production between
workers and employers shifts. So it should be after Medlin when an
employer alleges that economic conditions, and not injury-related
restrictions, cause a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
Absent a burden-shifting framework, it would be virtually, and
perhaps literally, impossible for an injured worker to prove the negative
proposition that economic conditions did not cause his loss of
wage-earning capacity. For the courts to assent to any manner of proof that
requires this showing would be to transform the workers' compensation
system into one unduly hostile to injured workers. A burden-shifting
framework, on the other hand, would allow the lower courts to adhere to
Medlin, as required, while also remaining loyal to the purpose of the
workers' compensation system and applying the law in a practical,
workable manner that is even-handed to both employees and employers,
requiring neither to shoulder an unreasonable burden.

workers' compensation laws "should be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative
intent to give compensation to workmen"); Donnell v. Cone Mills Corp., 299 S.E.2d 436,
439 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("The Workers' Compensation statutes in North Carolina should
be liberally construed to effect their purpose of compensating injured claimants and
recovery should not be denied by a technical or narrow construction.").
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